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I. INTRODUCTION
ORE than half of this article is devoted to discussing constitu-
tional challenges to section 263.405(i) of the Family Code gov-
erning the appeal of an order terminating a parent's parental
rights. Although the statute was found by a number of appellate courts
to be facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied, the Texas
Supreme Court declined to consider the issue. That may change with In
* Chief Justice, Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas. Chief Justice Thomas re-
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** Solo Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas. Ms. Vick received her BS
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re J. O.A.,1 a case from the Amarillo Court of Appeals, in which the court
not only found the statute unconstitutional as applied to the father, but
reversed the termination order.
In other areas of family law, the trend of the strict application by the
courts of the Family Code as written continues. However, as in other
areas of the law, the courts are lifting or relaxing technical procedural
bars to pursuing an appeal. Read together, while it may be easier to get
into court, you need to preserve your record and try your case cleanly to
prevail on appeal.
II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION 263.405(1)
Section 263.405 of the Family Code provides for an accelerated appeal
of a final order in cases where the Department of Family and Protective
Services ("the Department") has assumed the care of the child.2 Within
fifteen days of the trial court signing the final order, the party is required
to file with the trial court either a statement of the points the party in-
tends to appeal or a statement of points combined with a motion for new
trial.3 The notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of the trial
court entering the final order.4 Within thirty days of signing the final
order, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether a new
trial should be granted, whether any claim of indigency should be sus-
tained, and whether the appeal is frivolous as provided by section
13.003(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.5 The appellate re-
cord must be filed within sixty days after the final order is entered, and
the appellate court is required to "render its final order or judgment with
the least possible delay."'6
During the 2005 legislative session, the Legislature enacted section
263.405(i) of the Family Code prohibiting an appellate court from consid-
ering "any issue that was not specifically presented to the trial court in a
timely filed statement of points on which the party intends to appeal or in
a statement combined with a motion for new trial."' 7 All fourteen appel-
late courts complied with the Legislature's directive by concluding if an
issue is not presented to the trial court in a statement of points or in a
1. 262 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008), affd as modified, and remanded, 283
S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009). Although issued outside the Survey period, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the Amarillo court's determination, concluding the statute was unconstitu-
tional as applied "when it precludes a parent from raising a meritorious complaint about
the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination order." In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 339.
2. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405 (Vernon 2008).
3. § 263.405(b).
4. § 263.405(c); TEX. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(d) (Vernon 2008).
6. § 263.405(a), (f).
7. § 263.405(i). However, a statement of points is not required in the appeal of a
private termination action in which the children were never under the Department's care.
In re J.R.S., 232 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
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statement of points combined with a motion for new trial, that issue is not
preserved and may not be considered on appeal.8 However, a number of
those courts questioned the constitutionality of the statute and essentially
invited litigants to challenge the issue. The litigants accepted the invita-
tion, leading to a number of appellate decisions during the Survey period
addressing the constitutionality of the statute.
1. Facial Challenge-Due Process
In In re S.N.,9 the father argued section 263.405(i) was facially uncon-
stitutional because it required a parent to identify issues on appeal in a
statement of points prior to perfecting the appeal and before the trial
court was required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
father asserted the statute "places an arbitrary and unreasonable barrier
to appellate court consideration" and, therefore, deprived him of his right
to due process.10
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted "a facial challenge to
a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the statute will be valid."'" A statute is not invalid because it might oper-
ate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.' 2
Rather, the challenger must establish that every application of the statute
violates the constitution.' 13
The court noted a statement of points is not required to include matters
not found by the trial court until after the expiration of the fifteen-day
deadline if (1) the only alleged trial court error occurred prior to the
deadline for filing the statement of points, (2) the trial court filed its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law prior to the deadline for filing the
statement of points, or (3) the parent requests and receives an extension
of time in which to file the statement of points. 14 Because these examples
demonstrate situations in which the statute could operate constitution-
ally, the father's argument that the statute was facially unconstitutional
failed.15
8. In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 886 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260
S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
9. No. 14-07-00161-CV, 2008 WL 4547442 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 14,
2008), vacated and modified, 287 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no
pet.). Because the relevant analysis was not changed in the modified opinion, we cite to
the modified opinion in this Article.
10. 287 S.W.3d at 193.
11. Id. at 194 (quoting Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
12. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 195; see also In re N.C.M., 271 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2008, no pet.) ("Although we agree with appellant that appellate counsel often has little or
no background on what occurred at trial other than information obtained from trial coun-
sel or the client, we cannot agree with appellant that these circumstances automatically
result in depriving parents whose parental rights have been terminated of their due process
and equal protection rights. Therefore, we conclude appellant has not established that
section 263.405(i), by its terms, always has and always will operate unconstitutionally."); In
2009] 1199
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The Tyler Court of Appeals took a different approach to the argument.
In In re A. T.S.,16 the parents also argued section 263.405(i) was unconsti-
tutional because it required them to address in the statement of points
any alleged errors in the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law before the findings and conclusions were due under the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court noted that applying section 263.405(i) in these cir-
cumstances "would mean that the legislature did not intend for parents to
appeal any alleged trial court error occurring after the date they filed
their statement of points for appeal."' 17 Characterizing this as an "absurd
result," the court, without addressing the constitutionality of the statute,
concluded that section 263.405(i) does not apply to alleged errors occur-
ring after the deadline for filing a statement of points. 18
2. Facial Challenge-Separation of Powers
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals determined in In re D.W.19 that sec-
tion 263.405(i) was facially unconstitutional under the Separation of Pow-
ers Clause of the Texas constitution. 20 The court noted the Separation of
Powers Clause is "violated (1) when one branch of government assumes
power more properly attached to another branch or (2) when one branch
unduly interferes with another branch so that the other cannot effectively
exercise its constitutionally assigned powers. ' 21 Article V, section 1 of
the Texas Constitution vests "[t]he judicial power of this State ... in one
Supreme Court, in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals,
in District Courts . . . and in such other courts as may be provided by
law."' 22 An appellate court can have jurisdiction over a case under article
V, section 6(a) of the Texas Constitution 23 or under a specific grant of
re M.D., No. 07-07-0126-CV, 2008 WL 833227, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 28, 2008,
no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[A] procedural requirement, i.e., a specific number of days within
which to file a document, in and of itself, did not violate [the parent's] due process
rights.").
16. No. 12-07-00196-CV, 2008 WL 2930392 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 31, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
17. Id. at *19.
18. Id.; see also In re J.B., No. 09-07-625-CV, 2008 WL 4735434, at *3 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont Oct. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
19. 249 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008) (en banc), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d
462 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
20. Article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into
three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which
are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no
person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall
exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the
instances herein expressly permitted.
TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
21. In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635.
22. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
23. Article V, section 6(a) of the Texas Constitution grants the court of appeals appel-
late jurisdiction in "all cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or
appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.
[Vol. 621200
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jurisdiction by the Texas Legislature.24
The Department initially argued the court's appellate jurisdiction in
termination cases was purely statutory and, therefore, subject to any limi-
tations on the right to appeal imposed by the Legislature. The court dis-
agreed, noting its constitutional jurisdiction extends to appeals in "all
cases of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, which includes
termination cases. ' 25
The court then turned to the Department's argument that even the
court's constitutional jurisdiction is subject to restriction. The court
agreed its jurisdiction was not absolute. 26 It concluded, however, that
"neither is the legislature's power to restrict and regulate the appellate
courts' jurisdiction unlimited. '2 7 Although the Legislature may restrict
and regulate an appellate court's constitutional jurisdiction over appeals
from termination orders, it cannot interfere with the court's constitution-
ally granted powers. 28 Any attempt by the Legislature to do so would be
null and void.29
The court agreed with the Department that section 263.405(i) was in-
tended as a procedural rule.30 However, section 263.405(i) is not a substi-
tute for preserving error under the rules of civil and appellate
procedure.31 A party to a termination proceeding must preserve error
under the applicable rules of procedure before an issue may be consid-
ered by an appellate court, 32 but section 263.405(i) could prohibit an ap-
pellate court from considering even a properly preserved issue.33
The court stated that the Legislature may not use "rules of court" to
infringe upon the substantive power of the judiciary. 34 The court deter-
mined that section 263.405(i) is "directed at simply prohibiting exercise of
[the court's] appellate power to review issues. '35 The statute, therefore,
violates the Separation of Powers Clause because it:
interferes with [the court's] power to exercise discretion in determin-
ing whether to consider issues not listed in a statement of points,
even in absence of prejudice to the Department. The statute bars
our consideration of all issues not listed even when they were prop-
erly preserved for review under the rules of procedure. In effect, the
legislature decides for us that complaints not listed in a timely state-
ment of points are waived. In so doing, section 263.405(i) infringes
Provided, that the decision of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact
brought before them on appeal or error." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a).
24. In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 636.
25. Id.




30. Id. at 639.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 640.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 642.
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upon [the court's] ability to exercise a "core power" reserved for the
judicial branch by telling us not only how we must rule on issues
brought before us but that we cannot consider those issues at all.36
The court then held section 263.405(i) void and considered the mother's
issues on appeal.
Chief Justice Cayce, joined by Justice Holman, filed a separate opinion
concurring in the judgment but dissenting to "the majority's dicta opin-
ion, holding that section 263.405(i) violates the Separation of Powers
Clause. '37 Chief Justice Cayce noted the majority affirmed the termina-
tion without reaching the merits of the mother's complaints because the
mother failed to make a record of the hearing that was the basis of her
complaints.38 Because the court did not reach the merits of the mother's
complaints, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether "section
263.405(i) violates the separation of powers clause because it bars [the
court] from reviewing the merits of [the mother's] complaint. '39 There-
fore, Chief Justice Cayce concluded the majority's opinion was not only
dicta, but wrong.40
Chief Justice Cayce determined the right to appeal from a termination
order is statutory, not constitutional. 41 While the constitution gives an
appellate court the general power to review appeals, that power is subject
to restriction by the Legislature. 42 The limitations within section
263.405(i) regarding a parent's right to appeal a termination order, "con-
stitute[ ] a proper exercise of the Legislature's constitutional power to
regulate and restrict such appeals. ' 43 Section 263.405(i) does not violate
the Separation of Powers Clause, because it does not tell the court how to
perform its judicial function or how to rule on any issue.44 Rather, it
"simply limits appellate review of termination orders to issues that are
preserved in accordance with the procedures provided by the statute.
This limitation is well within the Legislature's constitutional power to reg-
ulate and restrict the right to appeal a termination order. '45 Justice Mc-
Coy filed a separate concurrence, agreeing with Chief Justice Cayce that
it was not necessary for the majority to reach the constitutional question
and its discussion of the constitutionality of section 263.405(i) was dicta.
In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court denied the Depart-
ment's petition for review stating that it neither approved nor disap-
proved the Fort Worth court's holding that section 263.405(i) was
unconstitutional. 46
36. Id. at 645.
37. Id. at 648 (Cayce, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).





43. Id. at 650.
44. Id. at 651.
45. Id.
46. In re D.W., 260 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
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3. "As Applied" Challenge-Due Process
The Texarkana Court of Appeals was confronted with an "as applied"
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute in In re S.K.A. 4 7 The ar-
gument that a statute is unconstitutional as applied is premised on a gen-
erally constitutional statute operating "unconstitutionally concerning a
person because of that person's particular circumstances. '4 8 In S.K.A.,
the father argued that sections 263.405(b) and 263.405(i) of the Family
Code, as applied to him as an indigent parent without counsel, despite a
request that counsel be appointed to represent him, deprived him of due
process under both the United States and Texas Constitutions. 49
The father was living in Mississippi when the Department filed suit to
terminate his parental rights. After the father was served with citation in
February 2006, he called the court coordinator and said he was not able
to appear at the adversary hearing. While the record was not clear as to
the father's status at the time he was served with the petition, the father's
post-supervision release was revoked, and he was incarcerated in Missis-
sippi in July 2006. The trial court set the case for trial on December 11,
2006.50
In an envelope addressed to the court clerk, but with the district attor-
ney's courthouse suite number, postmarked December 1, 2006, the father
sent four documents: requesting a continuance; claiming indigency; re-
questing the appointment of counsel; disputing at least some of the
State's allegations; and raising a number of defenses. 5 1 The trial court
received these documents on December 11, the date of trial, but several
hours after the entry of a default judgment against the father which ter-
minated his parental rights. On January 2 or 3, 2007, the trial court ap-
pointed counsel to represent the father. On January 3, the father's
counsel filed a notice of appeal. On January 4, counsel filed a statement
of points and a motion for new trial and to set aside the default judgment.
After holding a hearing, the trial court found the father indigent, denied
the motion for a new trial, and found the father's grounds for appeal were
not frivolous.
The father's statement of points was not timely filed pursuant to sec-
tion 263.405(b). Therefore, the appellate court was prohibited by section
263.405(i) from considering the father's issues on appeal. 52 However, the
father asserted in both the trial court and on appeal53 that the statute, as
applied to him, violated his rights to due process under the Fourteenth
47. 236 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 886-87.
50. Id. at 884.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 886.
53. An "as applied" constitutional challenge can be waived. Id. However, the father
raised the challenge in both his timely motion for new trial and his untimely statement of
points. Therefore, the issue was preserved for appellate review. Id.
2009] 1203
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Amendment to the United States Constitution 54 and to due course of law
under article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution. 55
The court was initially required to "construe [the] statute in a manner
that render[ed] it constitutional and [gave] effect to the Legislature's in-
tent." 56 In doing so, the court considered "the statute's purpose; the cir-
cumstances of the statute's enactment; the legislative history; common-
law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar
subjects; a particular construction's consequences; . . . and the title, pre-
amble and emergency provision" of the statute. 57 The court found the
first four factors particularly relevant in considering the father's constitu-
tional challenge. 58 After determining it could "imagine no construction
of subsection [263.405(i)] that would give effect to its legislative intent
while allowing [the father's] issues, which had not been raised in a timely
filed statement of points, to be addressed in this appeal," the court con-
sidered the substance of the father's constitutional claim.59
Because the protections provided by the Federal Constitution and the
state constitution were "without meaningful distinction," the court's role
was to determine "whether the procedures [met] the essential standard of
fairness under the Due Process Clause."'60 The court first determined
that the father's interest in the care, custody, and control of his children
was a "fundamental liberty interest[ ]" and was constitutionally pro-
tected.61 Therefore, when the Department sought to terminate the fa-
ther's parental rights, it was required to provide the father with
"fundamentally fair procedures. '62
The court also considered the father's right to a meaningful appeal and
to counsel. Although the Federal Constitution does not guarantee any
right to appeal, Texas has provided a right to appeal from a judgment in a
parental termination case.63 However, after giving a party a right to ap-
pellate review, Texas may not "bolt the doors to equal justice. ' 64 There-
fore, the Legislature may not attempt to deprive a litigant of a
constitutional right "under the guise of a statute relating to procedure. ' 65
In order to comply with due process, a parent's right to appeal the termi-
54. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. Article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution provides "[n]o citizen of this State
shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner dis-
franchised, except by the due course of the law of the land." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
56. In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental
Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. 2002)).
57. Id. at 887-88 (quoting Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool, 74 S.W.3d at
381).
58. Id. at 888.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 889 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982)).
61. Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
62. Id. n.17 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)).
63. Id. at 889-90.
64. Id. at 890 (quoting M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996)).
65. Id. (quoting Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S.W.2d 1025, 1029 (1934)).
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nation of his parental rights must be meaningful. 66
Similarly, the Federal Constitution does not require the appointment of
counsel in every termination proceeding.67 However, the Texas Legisla-
ture has provided an indigent parent with a statutory right to counsel in a
termination proceeding. 68 Further, if the parent establishes he is indi-
gent, he is entitled to appointed counsel for appeal. 69 Finally, the parent
has the right to the effective assistance of his appointed counsel.70 Con-
sistent with this right, the court reasoned, "it would seem a 'useless ges-
ture' to require the appointment of constitutionally effective counsel but
when properly requested not require such counsel's appointment before
the critical time at which a procedural bar is imposed. '71
The court then turned to the three-part balancing test in Mathews v.
Eldridge72 to determine whether the procedure for appealing the termi-
nation of parental rights violated the father's right to due process. 73 The
court noted it was required to weigh "the private interests at stake, the
government's interest in the proceeding, and the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of parental rights" and balance that result against the presumption
that the procedural rule comports with constitutional due process.7 4 The
court concluded:
The calibration of the Eldridge factors in this case overcomes the
presumption that subsection (i) constitutionally prohibits appellate
review. While facilitating speedy finality for children and the oppor-
tunity for trial courts to correct mistakes are proper goals, the Legis-
lature has authorized a procedure, in barring untimely statements to
the trial court of issues intended to be raised on appeal, that, in the
particular facts of this case, has had a profoundly discriminatory ef-
fect. We find that barring appellate review, under subsection (i), of
[the father's] issues on appeal has the result of denying [the father]
the "fundamental fairness" to which he is entitled in parental rights
termination proceedings and appeals. Subsection (i), as applied, has
the effect of rendering [the father's] right to effective counsel a "use-
less gesture" and renders counsel's efforts at appeal a "meaningless
ritual." We therefore hold subsection (i) unconstitutional as applied
to an indigent parent not provided timely requested appointed coun-
sel during the critical period before the deadline established in sub-
section (b). 75
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981)).
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1) (Vernon 2008).
69. § 263.405(e).
70. In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 891.
71. Id. at 892.
72. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
73. In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 892.
74. Id. (quoting In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003)).
75. Id. The Waco Court of Appeals also found section 263.405(i) to be unconstitu-
tional as applied to an indigent parent when appellant counsel was not appointed until
after the time for filing a statement of points had expired. In re D.M., 244 S.W.3d 397, 415
(Tex. App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh'g). Chief Justice Gray dissented, concluding
that the mother failed to properly invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction.
2009] 1205
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The court determined the remedy for the constitutional violation was
to deem the father's late-filed statement of points as timely filed.76 After
considering the merits of each of the father's issues, the court affirmed
the trial court's judgment terminating the father's parental rights. The
Texas Supreme Court denied the father's petition for review in a per
curiam opinion stating "[i]n denying the petition, we neither approve nor
disapprove the holding of the court of appeals regarding the constitution-
ality of Texas Family Code section 263.405(i). ''77
4. "As Applied" Challenge-Ineffective Assistance
In In re J.O.A.,78 the trial court terminated both parents' parental
rights. Trial counsel for both parents filed notices of appeal and motions
to withdraw. Although the trial court never ruled on the motions to with-
draw, appellate counsel was appointed for the mother seventeen days af-
ter the termination order was signed and for the father twenty-seven days
after the order was signed. Neither parent filed a timely statement of
points. On appeal, the parents contended section 263.405(i) was uncon-
stitutional as applied to them because their due process right to effective
assistance of counsel was violated by their counsels' failure to file a state-
ment of points.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals first noted that an "as applied" chal-
lenge is waived if not raised in the trial court. 79 However, the parents'
claim was premised on their counsels' failure to file a statement of points.
The court, therefore, considered the parents' claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 80 In doing so, the court necessarily determined a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel premised on counsel's failure to file a
statement of points may be raised for the first time on appeal. 81
The court determined that because a statement of points is necessary
for appellate review, the deadline for filing a statement of points is a criti-
cal stage of the proceeding at which the parents were entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. 82 The court further concluded an attorney repre-
76. In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 894. However, a parent must do more than simply
assert that the statute violates the due process rights of an indigent parent who is ap-
pointed new counsel on appeal. Rather, the parent must demonstrate that he suffered
harm. In re R.D.G., No. 12-07-00322-CV, 2008 WL 2122413, at *2 (Tex. App.-Tyler May
21, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.L.B., 269 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2008, no pet.). Potential harm to the parent could include: (1) meaningful participation in
the hearing to determine whether any appeal would be frivolous, (2) preparing a record to
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and (3) making it impossible to
meet the Department's arguments the points for appeal were frivolous. In re M.L.B., 269
S.W.3d at 762. See also In re A.F., 259 S.W.3d 303, 307-08 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, no
pet.) (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
77. In re S.K.A., 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
78. 262 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008), affd as modified and remanded, 283
S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009).
79. Id. at 17.
80. Id.
81. Although issued outside the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court has agreed
with this position. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 339.
82. In re J.O.A., 262 S.W.3d at 18.
[Vol. 621206
Parent and Child
senting an indigent parent in the trial of a termination proceeding contin-
ues to represent the parent until the judgment is final or counsel is
expressly discharged by the trial court.83 Therefore, each parents' trial
counsel had a duty to file a timely statement of points.84
Under Strickland v. Washington, counsel is ineffective if: (1) counsel's
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced
the complaining party. 85 In considering the first prong, the Amarillo
court noted the performance is deficient if the representation is "so
grossly deficient as to render the proceedings 'fundamentally unfair." 8 6
The filing of a statement of points in a termination case is a "straightfor-
ward procedure" and something "any competent trial counsel practicing
in this area of the law should know."'87 Therefore, the first Strickland
prong was satisfied.
Turning to the second prong, each parent contended counsel's failure
to file a statement of points prevented the parent from presenting a meri-
torious point on appeal. The court concluded that "to the extent their
issue is meritorious," there was a reasonable probability that without
counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.88 Therefore, each parent established that the parent's
counsel was ineffective by failing to file a timely statement of points.
Because counsel was ineffective, the court considered whether the inef-
fective assistance deprived the parents of their constitutional right to due
process. As in S.K.A., the court turned to the Eldridge analysis. The fac-
tors considered by the court in conducting the analysis included the right
of a parent to raise his or her child, the risk of permanent loss of the
parent-child relationship, the parents' and the child's interest in a just and
accurate decision, the governmental interest in protecting the best inter-
est of the child and in not unduly prolonging termination proceedings,
and the risk of the erroneous deprivation of parental rights.8 9 The court
concluded:
[w]hen we balance the presumption that our procedural rules com-
port with constitutional due process requirements against the El-
dridge factors, we conclude that those factors weigh in favor of
review most in those situations where a review of the sufficiency of
the evidence raises the greatest concern for the potential of an erro-
neous deprivation of parental rights. In other words, where ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel has prevented a review of the sufficiency of
the evidence, and a review of the sufficiency of the evidence reveals
that there is a high probability that a parent's rights have been erro-
neously terminated, then due process considerations (i.e., the El-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).




89. Id. at 20-21.
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dridge factors) weigh in favor of a sufficiency analysis,
notwithstanding a procedural impediment. We acknowledge that
this reasoning will require an appellate court to review both legal
and factual sufficiency issues to determine if it should even consider
those issues. Any lack of logic in this process can be attributed to the
lack of logic in the statute itself.90
The court then reviewed the parents' legal and factual sufficiency points
and concluded that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the mother's
parental rights was slight, but that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the father's parental rights was high. Therefore, section 263.405(i) was
unconstitutional as applied to the father.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals addressed an identical claim in In re
S.M.T.,91 in which the mother had appointed trial counsel but the father
did not. The trial court terminated the parents' parental rights, but
neither parent filed a timely statement of points. After the deadline
passed for filing a statement of points, both parents requested the ap-
pointment of appellate counsel.
On appeal, the mother argued she received ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court noted "[c]ounsel's unjustifiable failure to preserve
certain issues for review . ..may deprive a parent of due process. '9 2
However, in this case the record did not support a finding that counsel's
performance was deficient. The mother was represented by trial counsel
during the time period for filing a statement of points. It was apparent
the mother knew she had a right to appeal, but did not inform trial coun-
sel she wanted to do so until after the deadline passed. Further, the
mother failed to develop a record at the post-trial hearing that would
demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient. 93 Finally, the evidence
did not support the conclusion that the mother had a valid challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence.94
B. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the appeal of a termination order
in several opinions during the Survey period. Overall, the court, as in
other areas, is trending away from precluding an appeal through the tech-
nical application of procedural rules. However, to ensure their right to
appeal is not lost, it is clear parties must protect their record and obtain
proper findings from the trial court.
1. Supplementation of the Record
In In re K.C.B.,95 after her parental rights were terminated by an asso-
90. Id. at 21.
91. 241 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.).
92. Id. at 653.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 653-54.
95. 251 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
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ciate judge, the mother filed a timely statement of points and appealed
the associate judge's order to the district court. After a trial de novo, the
district court terminated the mother's parental rights, and the mother
timely filed a second statement of points. Although the mother re-
quested the "statement of points" be included in the clerk's record on
appeal, only the first statement of points was included in the record. The
appellate court concluded the mother failed to comply with section
263.405(i) by filing a statement of points after the district court's judg-
ment and affirmed the judgment without reaching the merits of the
mother's issues. The mother filed a motion for rehearing contending the
first statement of points was sufficient but, in the alternative, moved to
supplement the clerk's record with the second statement of points. The
court of appeals denied both motions.
Relying on Worthy v. Collagen Corp.,96 the Department argued the
court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to supple-
ment the record after the case had been decided. The Texas Supreme
Court disagreed, noting in Worthy the appellant was granted leave to sup-
plement the record but failed to do so. The appellate court then pro-
ceeded to decide the case on the merits. Here, the record reflected
confusion on the mother's part and not a purposeful omission from the
record. 97 Further, allowing the supplementation would not require the
appellate court to reconsider a decision on the merits. 98 Noting that
"U]udicial economy is not served when a case, ripe for decision, is de-
cided on a procedural technicality ... [that] can be easily corrected," the
court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case for further consideration.9 9
2. Conservatorship and Termination
In In re J.A.J.,100 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a
mother's challenge to a termination order included a challenge to the trial
court's appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator.
The mother appealed the termination order, claiming the evidence was
insufficient to support a statutory ground for termination, 10 1 but did not
assign error to the trial court's finding that the Department should be
appointed sole managing conservator of the child. The court of appeals
reversed the termination order, including the appointment of the Depart-
ment as conservator. The Department appealed, contending that the
mother had not claimed any error in the appointment determination.
The court first noted that sections 153.002, 153.005, and 153.131 of the
Family Code outline the general standards for determining the conserva-
96. 967 S.W.2d 360, 365-66 (Tex. 1998).
97. Id. at 365.
98. Id. at 366.
99. Id. (quoting Silk v. Terrill, 898 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).
100. 243 S.W.3d 611, 612-13 (Tex. 2008).
101. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2008).
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torship of a child. 102 Section 153.002 requires the determination of con-
servatorship to be in the best interest of the child.103 Section 153.005
authorizes the appointment of a managing conservator and defines who
that conservator may be.10 4 Section 153.131 creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a parent will be named managing conservator, unless the
trial court finds the appointment would not be in the child's best interest
or that there is a "history of family violence involving the parents.' 10 5
Further, pursuant to section 263.404 of the Family Code, the trial court
may appoint the Department as sole managing conservator of a child
without terminating a parent's parental rights if the trial court finds that
(1) the parent's appointment would not be in the best interest of the child
because "the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical
health or emotional development," and (2) appointment of a relative of
the child or another person would not be in the best interest of the
child. 0 6
The court agreed with the mother that section 263.404 does not apply
when the trial court terminates a parent's parental rights. 10 7 However,
the Department sought conservatorship of the child not only following
termination, but under sections 153.005 and 153.131.108 Further, the trial
court not only terminated the mother's parental rights, but found that the
appointment of a parent would not be in the best interest of the child and
that the appointment of the Department was in the child's best inter-
est.10 9 The mother did not appeal these findings or the conservatorship
order.
The court also determined a challenge to the conservatorship order was
not subsumed in the challenge to the termination order because (1) the
elements necessary to terminate parental rights are different than those
taken into account when making a conservatorship decision, and (2) the
level of proof necessary to terminate parental rights is clear and convinc-
ing, while a conservatorship decision is made by the preponderance of the
evidence.1'0 Therefore, while the evidence could be insufficient to sup-
port the termination order, it could be sufficient to support the conserva-
torship decision.' The court then reversed the portion of the appellate
court's judgment overturning the trial court's conservatorship order."12
The court further clarified its position in denying the Department's pe-
102. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 614.
103. Id. (citing § 153.002).
104. Id. (citing § 153.005 (Managing conservator must be "a parent, a competent adult,
an authorized agency, or a licensed child-placement agency.")).
105. Id. (citing § 153.131 (appointment of a parent as conservator is not in child's best
interest if appointment would significantly impair child's physical health or emotional
development)).
106. Id. (citing § 263.404(a)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 615.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 615-16.
111. Id. at 616.
112. Id. at 617.
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tition for review in In re D.N.C.113 In D.N.C., the trial court terminated a
mother's parental rights without making any additional findings. Since
the "only available statutory mechanism for the Department's appoint-
ment was as a consequence of the termination pursuant to section
161.207," the mother's challenge to the appointment of the Department
as managing conservator was subsumed in her challenge to the termina-
tion order.114
3. Extension of Time to File Statement of Points
In In re M.N.,115 the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights.
The mother filed an untimely statement of points, but the trial court
granted her an extension of time to file the points. The court of appeals
held that section 263.405(i) did not allow for an extension of time to file a
statement of points and concluded that it could not consider the mother's
issues on appeal.
In the supreme court, the mother argued that Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 26.3 applies to allow an extension of time for filing a statement
of points. 116 The supreme court first noted that section 263.405 does not
address whether a trial court may grant an extension of time to file a
statement of points.117 However, in the interest of the "just, fair, and
equitable resolutions of issues," both the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure permit the extension of
deadlines under certain circumstances. 1 8 Further, while the Legislature
intended to expedite the appeal of termination orders, it also intended a
just, fair, and reasonable result for the parents. 1 9 Therefore, Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 5 applies to whether the trial court could grant an
extension of time for the mother to file her statement of points. 120
Here, in the motion to extend time, the mother's counsel stated that
she had used the date she received the termination order, rather than the
113. 252 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 319; see In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
pet. denied).
115. 262 S.W.3d 799, 800 (Tex. 2008).
116. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 provides an appellate court
"may extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within 15 days after the
deadline for filing the notice of appeal, the party:
(a) files in the trial court the notice of appeal; and
(b) files in the appellate court a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b)."
TEX. R. App. P. 26.3.
117. In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d at 802.
118. Id. at 802-03 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 5 and TEX. R. App. P. 26.3).
119. Id. at 803.
120. Id. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5 provides in relevant part:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an
act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court
for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion (a) with or without motion
or notice, order the period enlarged if application therefore is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previ-
ous order; or (b) upon motion permit the act to be done after the expiration
of the specified period where good cause is shown for the failure to act.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
20091 1211
SMU LAW REVIEW
date the order was signed, in calendaring the due date for the statement
of points. The Department did not contend that the mother's filing the
statement of points five days late caused it any prejudice. Therefore, ap-
plying the standard in Rule of Civil Procedure 5, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in extending the time to file the statement of
points.121
Justice Willett dissented, stating that the Legislature "set a firm fifteen-
day deadline for filing [the] statement of points.1' 22 Justice Willett would
"(1) hold that court-made rules of procedure do not trump the Family
Code's fifteen-day deadline and then, assuming preservation, (2) confront
head-on whether this statutory deadline violates [the mother's] due-pro-
cess rights or any other constitutional provision. '123
C. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In Texas, there is a statutory right to counsel for indigent persons in
cases brought by the State to terminate parental rights. 124 In In re J.C,125
the Department initiated a termination suit against the mother. In what
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals characterized as a "coordinated maneu-
ver," the Department dismissed its termination case on the same day that
the child's foster parents filed a private termination case.126 Because the
mother was defending a private termination case, rather than one
brought by the Department, she did not receive appointed counsel and
was forced to proceed pro se both at trial and on appeal. 127 The mother
requested appointment of counsel on appeal.128 The court abated the ap-
peal for the trial court to consider the request, which it denied. 129
The court determined that the Legislature had mandated the appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent parent only in a termination suit filed by
a governmental entity. 130 Because there is no mandatory statutory right
to the appointment of counsel in a private termination case, the court
overruled the mother's issue.131
III. STANDING
1. Grandparent Access
The San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether grandparents
could have standing to seek access to their grandchildren based on equi-
121. In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d at 804.
122. Id. at 805.
123. Id.
124. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (Vernon 2008).
125. 250 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied), petition for cert.
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3015 (U.S. Jun. 25, 2009) (No. 08-1596).
126. Id.
127. Id.






table principles. In In re H.G.,132 the trial court terminated the parental
rights of both parents and appointed the maternal grandparents as man-
aging conservators. With the grandparents' consent, the children were
adopted. More than two years later, the adoptive parents divorced and
were named joint managing conservators of the children. Eight months
later, the grandparents filed a petition for grandparent access contending
they only consented to the adoption because the adoptive parents prom-
ised that the grandparents would have access to the children following the
adoption. The adoptive mother responded, asserting the grandparents
did not have standing. The trial court agreed and dismissed the grandpar-
ents' suit.
On appeal, the adoptive mother argued section 153.434 of the Family
Code precluded the grandparents' suit.133 She also asserted neither es-
toppel nor quasi-estoppel could be used to confer standing.
The appellate court first noted that the Legislature has "provided a
comprehensive statutory framework for standing in the context of suits
involving the parent-child relationship."'134 Because the grandparents
could not demonstrate standing under the Family Code, they were barred
from pursing the suit unless an equitable principle conferred standing. 135
However, standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and
courts cannot "mindlessly produce [jurisdiction] based on equity" where
none exists under the legislative framework. 136
Chief Justice L6pez dissented, noting that because the grandparents
were the children's managing conservators at the time of the adoption,
their consent to the adoption was statutorily required.1 37 To obtain the
grandparents' consent, the adoptive parents represented that the grand-
parents would have access to the children. Those representations were
made at a time when the grandparents had standing to seek access to the
children. 138 Accordingly, Chief Justice L6pez concluded, the court's eq-
uity jurisdiction could be used to estop the adoptive mother from arguing
132. 267 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
133. In relevant part, section 153.434 of the Family Code provides that a grandparent
may not request possession of or access to a grandchild if each of the biological parents of
the child has had their parental rights terminated and the grandchild has been adopted by a
person other than the child's stepparent. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.434 (Vernon 2008).
134. In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 124.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 125.
137. Id. at 127 (citing § 162.010). Section 162.010(a) of the Family Code provides
[u]nless the managing conservator is the petitioner, the written consent of a
managing conservator to the adoption must be filed. The court may waive
the requirement of consent by the managing conservator if the court finds
that the consent is being refused or has been revoked without good cause. A
hearing on the issue of consent shall be conducted by the court without a
jury.
§ 162.010.
138. In re H.G., 267 S.W.3d at 125.
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the grandparents lacked standing.139
In response, the majority noted that the precedent relied on by Chief
Justice L6pez did not hold that estoppel can confer subject matter juris-
diction where none exists.140 The majority also noted that, although the
Family Code required the grandparents, as managing conservators, to
consent to the adoption, the trial court could have waived the consent if it
found consent was refused without good cause. 141 Finally, the majority
agreed that the grandparents had standing prior to the adoption but dis-
agreed with Chief Justice L6pez's suggestion that equity mandated a con-
tinuation of the pre-adoption standing due to the adoptive parents'
purported misrepresentations.14 2 Rather, "section 154.433 coupled with
section 153.434, establishes 'a bright line before which a grandparent's
request for access of a grandchild may be made and after which it may
not."1 43 Because the grandparents did not seek the available statutory
remedy prior to the adoption, they were statutorily precluded from doing
so after the adoption.' 44
2. Same-Sex Couples
In In re Smith,145 one partner in a same-sex relationship, gave birth to
twins conceived by artificial insemination by an anonymous donor. When
the twins were four months old, both partners filed a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship ("SAPCR"). When the twins were five months
old, the trial court signed an agreed order appointing the two women
joint managing conservators and giving them equal possession of the chil-
dren at all times. Over five years later, the two women separated. The
mother of the twins filed a motion to vacate the agreed order, while her
former partner filed a petition to modify it. The trial court entered tem-
porary orders rotating possession of the children between the two wo-
men. After the trial court denied the mother's motion to vacate the
temporary orders, the mother sought mandamus relief.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals noted standing is a component of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and the Family Code contains a comprehensive
statutory framework for standing. 146 The former partner acknowledged
she did not have standing under the statute at the time the original peti-
tion was filed because the twins were only four months old at the time.147
139. Id. at 126 (citing Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 242 S.W.3d 67, 71-
72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied); Eckland Consultants, Inc. v. Ryder,
Stilwell Inc., 176 S.W.3d 80, 87-88 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).
140. Id. at 125.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 125-26 (citing Bowers v. Matula, 943 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1997, no writ)).
144. Id. at 126.
145. 262 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 465.
147. Id. at 466. Specifically, the former partner was not "a person, other than a foster
parent, who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months
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The former partner argued, however, that the mother's standing was suf-
ficient to support jurisdiction in the trial court. The court disagreed, not-
ing that a "party cannot confer jurisdiction either by consent or
agreement."14 8
The former partner next argued that the mother was equitably es-
topped from complaining about the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Again, the court disagreed, noting that standing is governed by the Fam-
ily Code. 149 If the trial court does not have jurisdiction, a party is not
entitled to relief, "regardless of their individual or collective wishes."
150
Each party bringing suit must have standing to do so. 151 Because the
former partner did not have standing, the original order and the tempo-
rary orders modifying the original order were void.
3. Temporary Guardians
In In re A.D.P.,152 through a series of terminations and adoptions, the
child became the sibling of his mother and his grandmother. After the
death of his great-grandmother (also his adoptive mother), the child ulti-
mately began living with an unrelated couple. After the child's sister
(formerly his grandmother) notified the couple of her intent to remove
the child from the county, the couple filed an application for temporary
guardianship of the child. The trial court granted the request and named
the couple temporary guardians of the child for sixty days. The couple
immediately filed a SAPCR, requesting the trial court appoint them non-
parent sole managing conservators of the child. The sister, along with her
other sister (formerly the child's mother), filed a counter-petition seeking
to be named sole managing conservators of the child. The guardianship
proceeding and the SAPCR were subsequently consolidated. The trial
court named the couple sole managing conservators of the child and gave
the sister (formerly the child's grandmother) access to the child. Both
sisters appealed.
In the only issue relevant here, the El Paso Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a temporary guardian has standing to file a SAPCR. Under
section 102.003(a)(4) of the Family Code, a guardian of the person or the
estate of a child has standing to file a SAPCR. 153 The question was
whether a temporary guardian fell within the definition of guardian.
Using the rules of statutory construction, the court noted the term
"guardian" in the Probate Code is "a person who is appointed guardian
under Section 693 of the Probate Code, or a temporary or successor
ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition .. " TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon 2008).
148. In re Smith, 262 S.W.3d at 466.
149. Id. at 467.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 281 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(4) (Vernon 2008).
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guardian. ' 154 The court concluded the term "guardian" in the Family
Code must be construed in accordance with the Probate Code.155 There-
fore, a temporary guardian has standing to file a SAPCR. 156
IV. PARENTAL PRESUMPTION AND GRANDPARENTS
In In re V.L.K.,'157 the Texas Supreme Court concluded the standard
and burden of proof differ in original custody determinations and in mod-
ification proceedings. Under chapter 153 of the Family Code, the Legis-
lature codified a "parental presumption" in an original proceeding. 158
However, in a modification proceeding, under chapter 156 of the Family
Code, the Legislature did not impose different burdens on parents and
nonparents. 159 Nor does the parental presumption in chapter 153 apply
in a chapter 156 modification proceeding.160 Rather, section 156.101
states that a trial court "may modify an order that provides for the ap-
pointment of a conservator of a child, that provides the terms and condi-
tions of conservatorship, or that provides for the possession of or access
to a child if modification would be in the best interest of the child and the
circumstances of the child, conservator, or other party affected by the
order have materially and substantially changed" since the date of the
rendition of the order.161
During the Survey period, several courts applied the reasoning in
V.L.K. to situations in which grandparents sought access to the
grandchild or to be named managing conservator of the grandchild. 162 In
the first situation, the grandparent and the parent entered into an agree-
ment allowing the grandparent access to the child. The parent later
sought to void or modify the agreement, arguing that the grandparent
could not overcome the presumption that a parent acts in the best inter-
est of the child.163 A trial court cannot order grandparent possession or
access unless the grandparent overcomes this presumption by proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that denial of possession of or access to
a child would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional
well-being. 164 The courts concluded this presumption did not apply in a
154. In re A.D.P., 281 S.W.3d at 548-49 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 601(11)
(Vernon 2003)).
155. Id. at 549.
156. Id.
157. 24 S.W.3d 338, 339-40 (Tex. 2000).
158. Id. at 341.
159. Id. at 343.
160. Id. at 344.
161. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2008).
162. As a side note, the Texas Supreme Court concluded a trial court could not award
temporary grandparent visitation without giving the parent a meaningful opportunity to be






In the second situation, one of the parents died and the grandparents
sought to be named the managing conservators of the child. Here, the
living parent first argued that the prior conservatorship order was void
following the death of the other parent and, therefore, the grandparents'
suit was an original suit, not a modification. 166 The parent asserted that
he was entitled to the presumption that a parent should be named sole
managing conservator of the child. 167
The courts rejected this argument, noting that following the death of
the child's managing conservator, a person with whom the child and the
child's managing conservator resided "for at least six months ending not
more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition" has
standing to bring a SAPCR.168 Because the Family Code "encompasses
modification of a prior order following the death of a sole managing con-
servator," the grandparents' suit was a modification, not an original peti-
tion.169 Accordingly, the parental presumption did not apply.' 70
Finally, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals has concluded that
the parental presumption does not apply in a dispute between grandpar-
ents. In In re Smith, 7 the paternal grandfather and his wife were named
joint managing conservators of the child. The paternal grandmother re-
quested access to the child. After the trial court entered temporary or-
ders granting the grandmother's request, the grandfather and his wife
sought mandamus relief contending that the grandmother failed to prove
that the denial of access to the child would significantly impair the child's
physical or emotional well-being.
The court noted a trial court should presume a fit parent acts in the
child's best interest.172 However, the grandfather and his wife, as
nonparents, could not claim the presumption.'7 3
165. In re T.D.J., No. 12-07-00188-CV, 2008 WL 5006178, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler Nov.
26, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); Spencer v. Vaughn, No. 03-05-00077-CV, 2008 WL 615443, at
*8 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 6, 2008, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
166. In re Vogel, 261 S.W.3d 917, 921-22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig.
proceeding); In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re
C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
167. Section 153.131 of the Family Code contains a presumption that it is in the best
interest of the child to appoint a parent sole managing conservator of the child unless the
court finds the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emo-
tional development. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a) (Vernon 2008).
168. In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217 (citing §§ 102.003(a)(11), 156.002(b)); see also
In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d at 808-09 (concluding grandmother had standing under section
102.003(a)(9) of the Family Code even though grandmother's care, control, and possession
of child was not exclusive).
169. In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 217.
170. In re Vogel, 261 S.W.3d at 923; M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d at 812; C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d
at 215.
171. 260 S.W.3d 568, 570 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).





In In re Rodriguez,174 the Attorney General ("AG") filed a child sup-
port action against the father. Shortly thereafter, the wife filed for di-
vorce and the two proceedings were consolidated. In his response in the
divorce proceeding, the father claimed he was not the biological father of
two children born during the marriage and requested genetic testing of
the children. Both children were over four years old when the father
made the request.
An associate judge ordered the genetic testing and the AG appealed to
the district court. The district court denied the appeal. The wife and the
AG sought mandamus relief, arguing that a proceeding to determine par-
entage was barred by the four-year statute of limitations in section
160.607(a) of the Family Code.1 75 The father contended that the limita-
tions period was tolled by the mother's fraud.
While the petition for writ of mandamus was pending in the appellate
court, the associate judge entered an order that the testing should pro-
ceed within five days of the order. The mother and the AG appealed this
order to the district court. The district judge not only affirmed the associ-
ate judge's order, but ordered the testing take place instanter, by noon on
the day the order was entered:
The Court's position is that the truth does not know a statute of limi-
tations. The Attorney General has not shown any reason that the
children should not be tested. It is clearly in the children's best inter-
est to know who their father is. It is clearly in the State's best inter-
est to know who the father is so the correct person can be paying
child support. Appeal denied. Testing ordered immediately.1 7 6
That afternoon, the mother and the AG sought an emergency stay from
the appellate court. The court issued the stay, but the genetic testing pro-
ceeded and the testing facility prepared a parentage report. The appel-
late court ordered all copies of the report sealed and filed with the
appellate court.
The court concluded that issues of paternity are for the Legislature. 177
174. 248 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding).
175. Section 160.607 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by Subsection (b), a proceeding brought
by a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the
parentage of a child having a presumed father shall be commenced not later
than the fourth anniversary of the date of the birth of the child.
(b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between a
child and the child's presumed father may be maintained at any time if the
court determines that:
(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child did not live together
or engage in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time
of conception; and
(2) the presumed father never represented to others that the child was
his own.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607(a) (Vernon 2008).




Section 160.607 establishes Texas's policy to "generally limit challenges to
legally established paternity to four years after the birth of the child. ' 178
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to apply the four-year
statute of limitations established by the Legislature. 179
The trial court also abused its discretion by placing the burden on the
AG to show that the children should not be tested.180 The statute placed
the burden on the husband to establish the exception to the limitations
period in section 160.607(b).1 81 The father put on no evidence to estab-
lish the statutory requirements.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the testing to be
performed instanter under the threat of contempt.1 82 The record con-
tained no evidence of an emergency requiring immediate testing. 183 By
ordering the testing be done immediately, the trial court denied the
mother and the AG the ability to "obtain meaningful review of the order
prior to the time it had to be completed under threat of contempt."'1 84
VI. CHILD SUPPORT
The Dallas Court of Appeals also considered the status of missed child
support payments. In Burnett-Dunham v. Spurgin, 85 the parties divorced
in 1967 and the father was ordered to make weekly child support pay-
ments until the youngest child turned eighteen years old. In March 2006,
when the children were in their forties, the mother filed a notice of appli-
cation for judicial writ of withholding and a child support lien seeking
over $200,000 in unpaid child support. The trial court dismissed the ac-
tion, holding that section 157.327 of the Family Code was not available to
the mother.186
The court first noted that under the Family Code "a child support pay-
ment not timely made constitutes a final judgment for the amount due
and owing, including interest as provided in this chapter.' 87 The court
concluded the "plain and common meaning of the statute is clear: once a
child support payment is overdue, it becomes a final judgment.' 88 There
is nothing to show the Legislature meant the term "final judgment" to
have a different meaning in the family law context than in other areas of
the law.1 89 The court recognized that the Texarkana Court of Appeals
178. Id.
179. Id. at 452-53.





185. 245 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
186. Section 157.327 of the Family Code allows for the execution and levy on the finan-
cial assets of a child support obligor. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.327 (Vernon 2008).





reached a different conclusion in In re Kuykendall,a90 but disagreed with
the finding that a "final judgment" within the context of the Family Code
does not mean final. 191
The father's last payment was due on March 27, 1979 and became a
final judgment at that time. A writ of execution must be issued within ten
years after the rendition of a judgment or the judgment becomes dor-
mant.1 92 Execution may not issue on a dormant judgment unless it is
revived.' 93 A dormant judgment must be revived within two years of be-
coming dormant. 194 Therefore, there is a twelve-year residual limitation
period for final judgments. 195 Because the mother waited too long before
filing, each missed payment (i.e. final judgment) became dormant. 196
VII. CONCLUSION
It was an interesting year in this area of the law, particularly regarding
the strong opinions from the appellate courts on how to achieve consider-
ation of the merits of a parent's appeal of a termination order in the face
of section 263.405(i). Although the courts' willingness to excuse both
technical and substantive procedural bars to the ability to maintain an
appeal increased, the final outcome remained the same. The courts con-
tinue to strictly apply the language and requirements of the Family Code.
It, therefore, remains essential for a litigant to know what he is required
to prove and how he is required to prove it in order to obtain a judgment
and maintain it on appeal.
190. 957 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.) (holding "although la-
beled as 'final judgments' in the Family Code, the individual monthly arrearages are not
final judgments to which the dormancy statute should be applied"). See also In re T.L.K.,
90 S.W.3d 833, 838-39 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); In re S.C.S., 48 S.W.3d 831,
835-36 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied.).
191. Burnett-Dunham, 245 S.W.3d at 17.
192. Id. (citing § 34.001).
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.006 (Vernon 2008)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 18.
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